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Purtell, 216 Ill. 629, 75 N.E. 334 (1905) ; Quaid v. Ratkowsky, 183 App. Div. 428,
170 N.Y. Supp. 812 (1918). Where there is no mixing of assets, where the books
of the parties are kept separately, and all money withdrawn by the sole stockholder
or parent corporation is applied on dividends, wages, and other forms of legitimate
indebtedness, then the insolvent corporation stands alone as a separate corporate
entity. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 45 Sup. Ct. 250, 69
L.ed. 634 (1924) ; Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, Inc., 21 F. (2d) 720 (C.C.A.
8th, 1927) ; Midwest Air Filters Pacific, Inc. v. Finn, Sheriff, et al., 201 Cal. 587,
258 Pac. 382 (1927). However, if a scheme to defraud creditors can be detected
in the organization of a new corporation, then, no matter how formal the keeping of books may be, no matter how rigidly the assets of the corporations are
separated, the corporate entity of the insolvent corporation will be disregarded
and the creditors permitted to reach the assets of the parent corporation. Colnnierce Trust Co. et al. v. Woodbury et al., 77 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A. 8th, 1935).
Where the insolvent corporation has no working capital or property except that
which the parent corporation or stockholder allows it from time to time, the
creditor of such insolvent corporation is permitted to recover from the parent
corporation. Portinzouth Cotton Refining Corp. v. Fourth National Bank of
Montgomery, 280 Fed. 879 (M.D. Ala. 1922). Similarly, a creditor should be
able to fix responsibility upon the parent corporation where such corporation has
permitted the insolvent debtor corporation to draw checks upon its bank account,
and where the two corporations have the same officers and stockholders. Spokane
Merchant's Ass'n. v. Clere Clothing Co., 84 Wash. 616, 147 Pac. 414 (1915). Also,
where the insolvent debtor corporation has made advances for the parent corporation and no separate books have been kept, the creditor should be permitted
to reach through to the assets of such parent stockholder. In re Muncie Pulp Co.,
139 Fed. 546 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1905).
The Michigan court in the instant case points out the distinction between disregarding corporate entity in favor of creditors and disregarding it for other
purposes such as where it is attempted to be used as a device for justifying the
raising of public utility rates. People v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 246 Mich.
198, 224 N.W. 438 (1929). Such distinction is important. Facts which will justify
the disregard of corporate entity in one case might not prove important in the
other.
ROBERT J. BUER.

TORTS-LANDLORD AND TENANT-"SAFE PLACE" STATUTE.-The plaintiff, living

with her niece in the defendant's apartment building, sustained injuries while
searching for the lockers in the basement. Unfamiliar with the premises and
without making inquiry as to the location of the lockers, she wandered into an
unlighted room, and, while searching for the light, fell from a raised platform
to the floor of defendant's boiler room. By special verdict the defendant was
found to be eighty per cent negligent. Held, judgment reversed. The plaintiff
was found to be in the position of a trespasser, toward whom the owner of a
public building owes no duty to maintain the same as a safe place. Grossenbach v.
Devonshire Realty Co., (Wis. 1935) 261 N.W. 742.
Owners of public buildings are imposed with the same duty to maintian such
buildings in a safe condition for the tenants as is imposed upon the employer
to render the place of employment safe for his employees. Zeininger v. Preble,
173 Wis. 243, 180 N.W. 844 (1921). Such duty applies also to frequenters. Wilson
v. Evangelical Lutheran Church, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930) ; Bunce v.
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Grand & Sixth Bldg., Inc., 206 Wis. 100, 238 N.W. 867 (1931); Washburn v.
Skogg, 204 Wis. 29, 233 N.W. 764 (1931). A "frequenter" is defined as "every
person other than an employee who may go in or be in a public building under
circumstances which render him other than a trespasser." Wis. STAT. (1933)
§ 101.01. A trespasser is one on the premises without invitation, express or implied, and solely for his own pleasure, convenience, or purpose. Peake v. Buell,
90 Wis. 508, 63 N.W. 1053 (1895) ; Zartner v. George, 156 Wis. 131, 145 N.W. 971
(1914) ; Klemnens v. Morrow Milling Co., 171 Wis. 614, 177 N.W. 903 (1920). The
duty of the owner to maintain in a safe condition a building that is a public
building under the statute extends only to that portion of the premises which
is used by tenants or the public. Gobas v. Val Blatz Brewing Co., 179 Wis. 256,
191 N.W. 509 (1923) ; Bewley v. Kipp, 202 Wis. 411, 233 N.W. 71 (1930). In the
instant case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to comply with
the statute stipulating the degree of safety necessary in buildings of this character. Wis. STAT. (1933) § 101.06. This allegation would have been correct had
the plaintiff sustained injuries under similar circumstances in some portion of the
building provided for the use of tenants. The trial court held the plaintiff to be a
frequenter, not a trespasser, and therefore within the protection of the statute.
This contention was overruled on appeal, the court stating that since the plaintiff
entered a portion of the building not maintained for the use of the tenants and
and to which the tenants were not invited, either expressly or by implication ,she
became a trespasser. Since a trespasser is afforded no protection under the
statute, the plaintiff has no cause of action.
CLAYToN A. CAmE.

TRADE MARKS-UNFAIR COMPETITION-RIGHT OF PmvAcy-The plaintiff is a

manufacturer of baseball bats. For a consideration, paid to the persons concerned,
it obtained the exclusive right to use the names of prominent baseball players.
The defendant company is a competitor of the plaintiff. Without authority from
the assignors or from the plaintiff, the defendant used the same names on its
manufactured product. There is no question of similarity in appearance of the
two sets of bats. The plaintiff asked for an injunction restraining the defendant
from using on its bats the names of the baseball players who had given to the
plaintiff the exclusive right to the use of their names. The trial court granted the
relief as requested. On appeal, held, judgment modified, and as modified, affirmed;
the defendant's conduct amounted to unfair competition. Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F. (2d) 763 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935).
Whether a person will be protected against the indiscriminate use of his
name depends in each jurisdiction on the choice of policy made by the court or
the legislature therein. It has been held that a prominent man cannot during his
life, nor can his widow after his death, get relief against the use of his name
and likeness in the advertising of articles for public sale where there is nothing
libellous about the picture. Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372,
80 N.W. 285, 45 L.R.A. 219 (1899). It was suggested therein that a person in
public life waives his right to privacy to the extent that the public, too, has an
interest in his likeness. An important court has held that no person will be
protected against the indiscriminate use of his likeness or name by third parties
until the legislature shall so prescribe. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,
171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 59 L.R.A. 478 (1902) ; but see contra, Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A. 101 (1905) and Munden
v. Harris,153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911). Under the Civil Rights Law

